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Abstract 
 
The Indonesian banking sector has been restructured since Asian financial crisis and 
restored to soundness. The capital adequacy ratio (CAR) returned to a sound level; 
however, the average excess capital has become too high, while credit disbursement has 
remained low. This paper investigates the determinants of excess capital among Indonesian 
banks and its effects on credit growth during the 2000s. The results indicate that the 
determinants of excess capital vary widely depending on bank type. Return on equity 
(ROE) affects excess capital negatively among domestic banks, and the effect of 
non-performing loans is mixed, differing for various bank types. Excess capital affects 
credit growth positively, except among foreign banks. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In 1997, the Indonesian banking sector was heavily damaged by the Asian financial crisis. 
In 1998, the average capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of commercial banks sharply dropped to 
minus12.9% due to the devaluated rupiah. The banking restructuring process restored the 
soundness of banks; the CAR has increased to an adequate level. In fact, the CAR became 
too high for some banks, and the average excess capital remained at a high level during the 
2000s. Although soundness was restored, credit disbursement remained low (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1 Bank assets and bank credits per GDP (1995-2014) 
Source: Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics. 
 
Bank soundness is mainly evaluated via the capital adequacy ratio. The introduction of 
a minimum capital requirement set by Basel I Accord enhanced studies of bank capital. 
Regulation of capital requirement raised questions about bank’s reaction to capital 
requirements; whether banks increase capital or alter the risk-weighted assets. A lot of 
empirical studies suggested that capital requirements affect banks’ capital ratios (Jackson 
et al., 1999) In recent years, many studies focus on cyclicality of bank capital. Many 
literatures suggested significant negative relationship between the business cycle and the 
capital buffers (Ayuso et al., 2004, Stolz and Wedow, 2005 Jokipii and Milne, 2009). 
Another research concerns is the impact of capital requirements. Several theories 
explain how bank capital effects bank lending. Capital shortage relative to the regulatory 
minimum may decrease in credit ( Gambacorta and Mistrull, 2004, Berrospide and Edge, 
2010). 
This paper investigates the determinants of excess capital and examines the effects of 
excess capital on bank lending in the Indonesian banking sector. Holding excess capital 
over the regulatory minimum creates an adjustment cost. Also, a breach of this regulation 
triggers costly supervisory actions; hence, banks have an incentive to hold more capital 
than required (a “capital buffer”) as insurance against a violation of the regulatory 
minimum capital requirement (Heid, Porath and Stolz, 2004). However, having too much 
excess capital may interfere with the financial intermediation function.  
   The rest of paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes a brief overview of the 
Indonesian banking sector. Section 3 examines the determinants of excess capital and its 
effect on lending behavior. Section 5 explains the results of a qualitative analysis of 
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individual banks’ financial data from 2001 to 2009. Section 5 presents the conclusions. 
 
 
2. Bank Regulations in the Indonesian Banking Sector 
 
2.1 Banking Sector in Indonesia 
 
The Indonesian banking sector has changed since the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Before 
the crisis, the Indonesian banking sector was underdeveloped. It was focused on 
quantitative expansion, not on the soundness of banks. Therefore, bank restructuring 
greatly changed the Indonesian banking sector, encouraging sound and prudent 
management. 
   There are five types of Indonesian commercial banks. Banks are categorized by 
ownership: state-owned banks; regional development banks; local private banks, which are 
comprised of private foreign-exchange banks (forex banks) and private 
non-foreign-exchange banks (non-forex banks); joint banks; and foreign banks. More than 
60% of state-owned banks’ shares are held by the Indonesian government.  Regional 
development banks are held by regional governments. Local private banks were originally 
fully owned by local capital, but now, major local private banks have been acquired by 
foreign capital (Hamada, 2014) whiles still being categorized as local private banks. Joint 
banks are held by local capital and a foreign bank jointly. A foreign bank is fully owned by 
a foreign bank. 
 
Table 1 Bank performance indicators by bank type. 
  ROA ROE NIM LDR NPL Operational exp./ Operational income 
December 1998 
State -84.6% 117.9% -11.6% 102.8% 64.9% 169.7% 
Forex -10.6% 46.0% 3.3% 66.9% 46.3% 101.3% 
Non-forex -5.2% -67.7% 6.8% 47.2% 46.5% 97.0% 
Joint -8.8% 54.9% 10.6% 253.6% 47.8% 56.3% 
Foreign 6.1% 786.9% 15.1% 89.7% 43.8% 43.8% 
Regional 1.6% -29.2% 9.0% 75.4% 21.1% 82.5% 
December 2009 
State 2.5% 25.0% 6.2% 76.3% 4.0% 80.3% 
Forex -0.1% -17.9% 5.8% 73.9% 3.9% 122.2% 
Non-forex 0.0% -3.8% 6.6% 80.8% 4.0% 106.5% 
Joint 3.6% 10.7% 5.1% 94.6% 3.5% 64.2% 
Foreign 3.9% 12.9% 4.4% 102.7% 5.1% 56.3% 
Regional 3.7% 27.5% 9.1% 89.2% 2.3% 71.7% 
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Note: ROA = Return on Assets, ROE = Return on Equity, NIM = Net Interest Margin, LDR = 
Loan-to-deposit ratio, NPL = non-performing loans.  
Source: EKOFIN. 
 
Each bank type engages in a specific kind of banking business. Domestic banks 
(state-owned banks, regional development banks, and forex banks) provide both wholesale 
and retail banking. Non-forex banks’ business is mainly retail baking in the form of rupiah 
transactions. Joint and foreign banks provide wholesale banking for foreign companies, 
mainly those of their home country. Table 1 shows the major performance indicators in 
1998 and 2009. 
    The indictors show that the worst performance occurred in 1998 due to the Asian crisis 
and political turmoil. Though it took over 10 years, bank performance had improved by 
2009, except for the profit ratio, which had decreased due to the global financial crisis.  
 Figure 2 shows the development of outstanding bank credit by bank type. Financial 
liberalization and rapid economic growth have expanded the banking sector. During the 
1980s and 1990s, state-owned banks dominated the Indonesian banking sector. However, 
with development, local private banks had have grown to the same size as state-owned 
banks. As the figure indicates, state-owned banks and forex banks are the main players in 
the Indonesian banking sector, and regional development banks doubled their share of the 
total outstanding credit. 
 
Figure 2 Outstanding credits by bank type (1997-2009). 
Source: EKOFIN. 
 
0
200,000
400,000
600,000
800,000
1,000,000
1,200,000
1,400,000
1,600,000
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Regional-gov.
Foreign
Joint
Non-forex
Forex
State
5 
 
3. Determinants of Excess Capital and Lending behavior 
 
3.1 Empirical examination 
 
Figure 3 shows changes in excess capital by bank type from 1998 to 2009. Due to the Asian 
crisis, state-owned banks had a net capital deficiency until 1999. Since the beginning of the 
2000s, state-owned bank’s level of excess capital has remained relatively stable at around 
10%. Forex banks had high levels of excess capital, 33.7% in 1999 and 25.9% in 2000; since 
then, this value has been maintained a level from 13% to 20%.  Non-forex banks’ excess 
capital is always maintained at a high level of 20% to 35%. Joint banks hold very high levels 
of excess capital, ranging from 30 to 50%. Foreign banks and regional development banks 
keep excess capital at around the 25% and 13% levels, respectively. The level of excess 
capital varies with bank type, and since 2006, non-forex banks, joint banks, and foreign 
banks have increased their levels of excess capital.  
   
 
 
Figure 3 Excess capital by bank type (1997-2009). 
Source: EKOFIN. 
 
Figure 4 describes a range of excess capital by bank type. A crossbar indicates the mean 
of excess capital, a vertical line indicates the range from the minimum to maximum excess 
capital. The variances of forex bank, non-forex bank and joint banks are large; that of joint 
bank is exceptionally large. This implies that even within the same bank type group, there 
is great variety among banks. Therefore, the determinants of excess capital depend on an 
individual bank’s characteristics. 
 
-80.0%
-60.0%
-40.0%
-20.0%
0.0%
20.0%
40.0%
60.0%
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
State
Forex
Non-forex
Joint
Foreign
Regional-gov.
6 
 
 
Figure 4 Range of excess capital by bank type (1997-2009). 
Source: EKOFIN. 
 
   Gambacorta and Mistrulli explain the differences in capital level by bank size. Larger 
banks’ capital levels have been constantly below the average. Very small banks are better 
capitalized. These different capital ratios could reflect heterogeneity in their capacity to 
issue capital (Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004) In other words, larger banks, such as state 
owned-banks in Indonesia, have an advantage in terms of access to funds and the flexibility 
to raise funds in response to changes in their performance and macro-economic situation.  
Meanwhile, for small banks, such as non-forex banks in Indonesia, the capacity to raise 
funds is lower, and the adjustment cost is higher. Thus, smaller banks’, such as non-forex 
banks’ and joint banks’, capital levels are much higher than those of other, larger banks. 
 
 
3.2 The date and empirical model 
 
Our dataset was comprised of 118 banks: four state-owned banks, 34 forex banks, 30 
non-forex banks, 15 joint banks, nine foreign banks, and 26 regional development banks, 
which were in a database of Indonesian Banking Indicators, EKOFIN in Indonesia.  
The determinants of excess capital and its effect on credit growth are examined by 
System Generalized Method of Moments (SGMM) and panel data regressions, using the 
118 banks’ semi-annual financial data from 1998 to 2009. We estimate the following 
equations: 
 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑖,   (1) 
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where the dependent variable is excess capital (EXCESS) and the independent variables are 
total  assets (ASSET); nonperforming loan ratio (NPL), which is a proxy of RISK; return of 
equity (ROE); and GDP, which represents macro-economic variables. 
  ASSET is the natural log of the book value of total assets. Because larger banks’ capital 
adjustment cost is lower than that of smaller banks, the coefficient of ASSET is expected to 
be negative. RISK is the ratio of the number of non-performing loans to total loans; a riskier 
loan portfolio will increase capital; therefore, RISK positively affects excess capital. 
However, if it effects excess capital negatively, this implies moral hazard behavior (Francis 
and Osborne, 2012). ROE is the ratio of the total equity to the total assets in book value. It is 
a proxy of capital cost. 
 
∆𝐿𝑅𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛿𝑖𝑖𝐸𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖 + 𝜃𝑖𝑅𝐿𝐴𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑖,   
(2) 
 
where the dependent variable is growth of credit (ΔLOAN). The independent variables are 
ASSET, RISK, and CREDIT, which is the ratio of total credits to total assets. CREDIT is used 
to control for the effect of a bank’s intermediation level. 
 
 
 
Table 2 Data description (mean) by bank type (December 1997-December 2009) 
  All banks State Forex Non-forex Joint Foreign Regional 
No. of banks 118 4 34 30 15 9 26 
EXCESS CAPITAL 0.22 0.02 0.18 0.26 0.41 0.25 0.14 
 (0.39) (0.3) (0.35) (0.42) (0.65) (0.26) (0.1) 
ASSET * 10,600,000 128,000,000 13,800,000 677,208 3,549,976 12,500,000 3,389,304 
 (33,300,000) (97,300,000) (30,100,000) (1,535,761) (3,985,694) (11,700,000) (4,498,906) 
ROE 0.14 0.32 0.06 -0.03 0.14 0.76 0.20 
 (1.27) (1.4) (1.05) (0.72) (0.32) (3.52) (0.66) 
NPL 0.11 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.17 0.16 0.06 
 (0.36) (0.19) (0.55) (0.31) (0.27) (0.19) (0.11) 
CREDIT 0.52 0.51 0.53 0.53 0.63 0.47 0.44 
 (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.25) (0.22) (0.17) 
∆LOAN 0.16 0.07 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.28 0.15 
  (0.73) (0.17) (0.36) (0.74) (0.89) (1.78) (0.18) 
Note: Standard deviation is in parenthesis.  
*In millions of rupiah. 
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4. Empirical results 
 
4.1. Excess capital 
 
The results of the estimation are summarized in Table 3. The models are estimated using 
the System Generalized Method of Moments (SGMM). Regarding the results of the 
estimation for all banks, the only coefficient of lagged EXCESS CAPITAL is significant. As 
already explained, banks’ features differ depending on bank type; thus, all banks are 
divided into four categories, government banks (state-owned banks and regional 
development banks), forex banks, non-forex banks, and foreign banks (joint banks and 
foreign banks), to investigate determinants. 
ROE is a proxy for the direct costs of remunerating excess capital (Jokipii and Milne, 
2008), and the coefficient of ROE is negative and significant, except for foreign banks. 
Ayuso et al. (2004) and Jokipii and Milne (2008) showed a negative relationship between 
ROE and excess capital. Our results are consistent with their findings. The results of RISK 
are mixed and depend on bank type. In the model of private banks, for both forex and 
non-forex banks, RISK is significant and positive. This suggests that banks cope with 
increase in  risky portfolios by holding more capital. Meanwhile, in the model of 
government banks and foreign banks, RISK is negative and significant for government 
banks but not significant for foreign bank. This result is consistent with moral hazard 
behavior. 
Concerning GDP, representing economic growth, the coefficianet of government banks 
is negative but not significant. Those for forex banks and non-forex bank are positive and 
strongly significant. The value for foreign banks is not significant. This implies that during 
an economic upturn, forex banks and non-forex banks increase their capital because the 
cost of capital funding is lower. The coefficients of ASSET are insignificant for all models. 
 
4.2 Credit growth 
 
The results of the estimation of credit growth are summarized in Table 4. The models are 
estimated using fixed-effect panel regressions. Concerning the effect of excess capital on 
credit growth, the coefficients of EXCESS CAPITL are positive and significant, except that 
for foreign banks, which is negative and significant at the 10% level. This indicates that a 
well-capitalized bank can increase credit. In other words, it is possible to assume from the 
previous results that smaller banks, whose fundraising capabilities are lower than those of 
larger banks, attempt to increase their capital in order to expand credit. RISK negatively 
affects credit growth, but significant for only government banks. CREDIT has a negative 
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effect on credit growth. This indicates that banks adjust their ratio of credit to total assets to 
a certain level. ASSET and interest rate (INT) affect credit growth negatively. GDP growth 
has a positive effect on government banks, but its coefficient is very small. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper examines the determinants of excess capital among Indonesian commercial 
banks and the effects of excess capital on credit growth during the 2000s. The results 
indicate that the determinants of excess capital vary widely depending on bank type. 
Smaller banks, such as forex bank, hold high levels of excess capital due to their lower 
capacity of issue capital. This is reflected in the results of the estimation of ROE, which 
affects excess capital negatively among domestic banks. 
 The effects of the non-performing loan ratio are mixed, depending on bank type. GDP 
growth is not necessarily a determinant of excess capital for all banks. Excess capital affects 
credit growth positively, except for foreign bank. This indicates that well-capitalized banks 
can increase their credit. In other words, smaller banks attempt to increase their capital due 
their lower fundraising capabilities in order to expand credit. 
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Table3 Determinants of banks’ excess capital 
Dependent Variable = EXCESS(CAR-0.08) 
  All Banks Government Private Foreign 
        (State and regional government) (Forex) (Non-forex)  (Joint and Foreign) 
  Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
EXCESS(t-1) 0.871 *** 0.290 0.721 * 0.377 0.716 *** 0.033 0.524 *** 0.144 0.631 *** 0.055 
ASSET(t-1) 0.002  0.049 0.007  0.008 0.005  0.009 -0.029  0.037 0.007  0.045 
RISK(t-1) -0.219  0.407 -0.407 ** 0.167 1.043 * 0.517 0.482 * 0.242 -0.324  0.260 
ROE(t-1) -0.019  0.049 -0.117 ** 0.046 -0.107 *** 0.034 -0.301  0.179 0.149  0.151 
GDP -0.014  0.012 -0.012  0.014 0.041 *** 0.015 0.047 *** 0.015 0.041  0.049 
CONS 0.089  0.826 0.051   0.154 -0.304   0.188 0.227   0.446 -0.174   0.768 
Number of obs. 2558     644     736     651     527     
Sargan 
test( P-value) 0.739   1.000   0.981   0.524   0.997   
AR(1)  0.047   0.085   0.131   0.027   0.090   
AR(2)  0.328     0.928     0.193     0.857     0.497     
Note: Estimated using the System Generalized Method of Moments.  
*, **and *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
Table 4 Effects of excess capital on credit growth 
Dependent variable = credit growth                
  
ALL 
  
Government 
  Private 
Foreign 
      Forex   Non-forex 
 Coef.  SE  Coef.  SE  Coef.  SE  Coef.  SE  Coef.  SE EXCESS(t-1) 0.106 ** 0.051  0.084 ** 0.044  0.131 ** 0.050  0.651 *** 0.125  -0.208 * 0.118 ASSET(t-1) -0.085 *** 0.025  -0.056 *** 0.008  -0.043 * 0.024  -0.208 *** 0.068  -0.177 *** 0.053 RISK(t-1) -0.051  0.040  -0.236 *** 0.054  -0.008  0.022  -0.042  0.102  -0.315  0.233 CREDIT(t-1) -0.687 *** 0.104  -0.313 *** 0.050  -0.836 *** 0.090  -0.216  0.249  -1.061 *** 0.243 INT -0.016 *** 0.005  0.000  0.002  -0.015 *** 0.004  -0.019 * 0.010  -0.028 * 0.017 GDP(t-1) 0.002  0.007  0.009 *** 0.003  0.003  0.006  0.004  0.015  -0.015  0.025 CONS 1.909 *** 0.366   1.098 *** 0.127   1.384 *** 0.354           3.971 *** 0.921 
Number of obs. 1389      647  737    651    528   R-sq:  within =     0.247    0.209    0.096    0.033   between = 0.9953    0.658    0.001    0.022    0.519   overall =         0.226       0.105       0.035       0.033     
Note: Estimated using fixed-effects panel regression, except for foreign banks, which were estimated using random effects.  
*, **, and *** indicate significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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